Part Two

Iran Opinion on the Arizona Persian Page [ Reply | Next | Previous | Up ]

Part Two

en linea blackjack juegopbcn69

From: cdody@elekdoa.com
Date: 21 Sep 2007
Time: 07:48:39
Remote Name: 207.44.251.143

Comments

Fotknf en linea http://buscador.lycos.es/cgi-bin/pursuit?query=gratis%20casino%20site%3Aweb.ics.purdue.edu intento http://buscador.lycos.es/cgi-bin/pursuit?query=en%20linea%20juego%20virtual%20site%3Aweb.ics.purdue.edu hallazgo http://buscador.lycos.es/cgi-bin/pursuit?query=el%20apostar%20site%3Aweb.ics.purdue.edu informaciones aqui http://buscador.lycos.es/cgi-bin/pursuit?query=poker%20site%3Aweb.ics.purdue.edu apesadumbrado.

Blowjob Ninjas

From: salaka@babolaz.com
Date: 20 Sep 2007
Time: 15:51:16
Remote Name: 222.174.176.67

Comments

Apologize for http://www.barefootmaniacs.com/?wm_login=cdoom&p=j and http://www.milflessons.com/t1/pps=cdoom/join.htm so http://www.bigcockteenaddiction.com/?wm_login=cdoom&p=j or http://www.baitbus.com/t1/pps=cdoom/join.htm

Hoodia

From: Hoodia
Date: 19 Sep 2007
Time: 01:47:37
Remote Name: 76.67.196.109

Comments

Hoodia <a href="http://hoodia-lose-weight.blogspot.com">Hoodia</a> [url=http://hoodia-lose-weight.blogspot.com]Hoodia[/url http://hoodia-lose-weight.blogspot.com

Thank you

From: Las
Date: 28 Aug 2007
Time: 06:32:12
Remote Name: 200.161.200.163

Comments

<a href="http://australiaristorantehb.aceblog.fr">australia ristorante</a> <a href="http://melbourneristorantehb.aceblog.fr">melbourne ristorante</a> <a href="http://sfondianimalihb.aceblog.fr">sfondi animali</a> <a href="http://chirurgiaesteticahb.aceblog.fr">chirurgia estetica</a> <a href="http://cucineinmuraturahb.aceblog.fr">cucine in muratura</a> [URL=http://prodottiperderepesohb.aceblog.fr]prodotti perdere peso[/URL] <a href="http://calcolomutuohb.aceblog.fr">calcolo mutuo</a> [URL=http://quotazionimotohondahb.aceblog.fr]quotazioni moto honda[/URL] <a href="http://cittamessicoristorantehb.aceblog.fr">citta messico ristorante</a> [URL=http://velinahb.aceblog.fr]velina[/URL

nokia ringtones

From: None
Date: 15 Jun 2007
Time: 07:00:05
Remote Name: 71.196.35.194

Comments

viagra pharmacy

From: Doctus
Date: 13 Jun 2007
Time: 01:11:14
Remote Name: 207.44.251.142

Comments

Sorry that I did that http://home.skku.edu/~scos/bbs/zboard.php?viagra_uk of http://home.skku.edu/~scos/bbs/zboard.php?viagra_cialis or http://home.skku.edu/~scos/bbs/zboard.php?cheapest_viagra if http://home.skku.edu/~scos/bbs/zboard.php?generic_cialis

free government credit reports in credit report check

From: garnishment and credit score
Date: 10 Jun 2007
Time: 00:07:51
Remote Name: 62.231.243.136

Comments

gay boy

From: FreUkIoL
Date: 08 May 2007
Time: 17:41:22
Remote Name: 89.208.14.10

Comments

online soma

From: Doctus
Date: 04 May 2007
Time: 11:35:27
Remote Name: 207.44.251.111

Comments

Sorry that I did that http://gophertv.micro.umn.edu/sampleapp/pharmacy/nexium.htm of http://gophertv.micro.umn.edu/sampleapp/pharmacy/soma.htm or http://gophertv.micro.umn.edu/sampleapp/pharmacy/valtrex.htm if http://gophertv.micro.umn.edu/sampleapp/pharmacy/butalbital.htm

Soma carisoprodol3349

From: Doctus
Date: 01 May 2007
Time: 01:01:55
Remote Name: 207.44.251.195

Comments

sipewtReally sorry http://webhome.broward.edu/~kbelan/esg/3/buy_cheap_phentermine_online.html of http://webhome.broward.edu/~kbelan/esg/3/tramadol_hydrochloride.html or http://webhead.hagerstowncc.edu/~ellens/retro/pages/2/levitra_viagra.html if http://webhome.broward.edu/~kbelan/esg/3/tramadol_hydrochloride.html

Great work

From: US
Date: 27 Apr 2007
Time: 05:56:23
Remote Name: 59.93.247.87

Comments

[URL=http://acutoit.alkablog.com]acuto[/URL [URL=http://radioit.alkablog.com]radio[/URL [URL=http://programmagestionemagazzinit.alkablog.com]programma gestione magazzino programma gestione magazzino free[/URL] <a href="http://sborratenelculoit.alkablog.com">sborrate nel culo</a> [URL=http://smsfraseamorefrasismsgratit.alkablog.com]sms frase amore frasi sms gratis manchi amore[/URL] <a href="http://guidapokemonsmeraldoit.alkablog.com">guida pokemon smeraldo</a> <a href="http://fraseromanticait.alkablog.com">frase romantica</a> <a href="http://50anniit.alkablog.com">50 anni</a> [URL=http://versionigrecheit.alkablog.com]versioni greche[/URL] [URL=http://frasiperanniversarioit.alkablog.com]frasi per anniversario[/URL]

Great work

From: USA
Date: 25 Apr 2007
Time: 16:21:36
Remote Name: 213.30.141.186

Comments

Insurance dallas

From: rmatej@narki.dod.com
Date: 24 Apr 2007
Time: 19:38:03
Remote Name: 207.44.251.208

Comments

Forgive please http://alumni.nd.edu/~ndc_scp/form/1/international_travel_medical_insurance.html and http://alumni.nd.edu/~ndc_scp/form/1/whole_life_insurance.html also http://alumni.nd.edu/~ndc_scp/form/1/online_car_insurance.html or http://alumni.nd.edu/~ndc_scp/form/1/insurance_houston.html

FREE SEX

From: FreUkIL
Date: 23 Apr 2007
Time: 23:26:49
Remote Name: 89.208.12.122

Comments

http://swiki.fcla.edu:8000/SRN/uploads/free-sex-mpegs.html free sex, sex mpegs, sexy mpegs

Thank you

From: Washington
Date: 03 Jul 2006
Time: 09:03:23
Remote Name: 203.177.167.195

Comments

Very good site! I like it! Thanks! http://casino-royale-trailer.greatgl.info http://sweepstake.greatgl.info http://mohegan-sun-casino.greatgl.info http://bare-escentuals.greatgl.info http://dem-franchize-boyz.greatgl.info <a href="http://casino-royale-trailer.greatgl.info">casino royale trailer</a> <a href="http://sweepstake.greatgl.info">sweepstake</a> <a href="http://mohegan-sun-casino.greatgl.info">mohegan sun casino</a> <a href="http://bare-escentuals.greatgl.info">bare escentuals</a> <a href="http://dem-franchize-boyz.greatgl.info">dem franchize boyz</a> [URL=http://casino-royale-trailer.greatgl.info]casino royale trailer[/URL] [URL=http://sweepstake.greatgl.info]sweepstake[/URL [URL=http://mohegan-sun-casino.greatgl.info]mohegan sun casino[/URL] [URL=http://bare-escentuals.greatgl.info]bare escentuals[/URL] [URL=http://dem-franchize-boyz.greatgl.info]dem franchize boyz[/URL]

From: The 1953 Coup D'ETA in Iran
Date: 14 Sep 1998
Time: 15:50:25
Remote Name: 152.163.201.58

Comments

........Part two.....

OVERTHROW OF MOSADDEQ

On November 1, 1952, the staff of the British embassy left Tehran in a caravan for Beirut, ending the long era of British domination in Iran. The Rashidian network and several deep-cover operatives had been left behind, but it was clear that the British position in Iran had become very weak. Accordingly, Christopher Montague Woodhouse, the chief M16 officer in Iran at the time, was sent to Washington to seek U.S. support for a tentative plan to overthrow Mosaddeq (48).

Woodhouse's plan called for a coordinated uprising to be engineered by the Rashidians and certain Bakhtiari tribal leaders, with or without the Shah's approval. Although the British had been conspiring with Zahedi since August, they put forward several names as possible leaders of the coup. Woodhouse took his plan first to the CIA. Frank Wisner, the head of CIA covert operations, Allen Dulles, Wisner's deputy, and Kermit Roosevelt, Wisner's Middle East division chief, all favored a coup. However, lower-level Iran specialists in the CIA were opposed to the idea, as was the CIA station chief in Tehran, who viewed it as "putting U.S. support behind Anglo-French colonialism." Discussions were also held with State Department officials. Woodhouse was told that Truman would not agree to the plan, but that Eisenhower, who had just been elected president, probably would (49).

Zahedi continued to intrigue in this period, although the departure of the British undoubtedly hampered his efforts. Arms and money continued to flow into the Bakhtiari region, where Abul Qasem Bakhtiari was trying to enlist the support of the other khans. Zahedi reportedly promised to establish a "Free South in Iran," where the Bakhtiari would be given autonomy under the leadership of Abul Qasem. In January 1953, Zahedi's Majlis allies, led by Kashani, fomented a major dispute in the Majlis, apparently trying to create conditions that would lead to Mosaddeq's ouster. This effort came to an end on January 19, when Mosaddeq received a 59 to 1 vote of confidence (50).

In mid-February, Zahedi approached several army generals about a possible coup. His son, Ardeshir, told U.S. embassy officials that he was about to seize power, and identified his probable cabinet. At about the same time, a group of Bakhtiari tribesmen led by Abul Qasem and members of the Retired Officers' Association attacked an army column in the Khuzestan province and caused many casualties. Mosaddeq retaliated by arresting Zahedi and several others and threatening to resign. The Shah then announced that he would take a vacation abroad, which provoked widespread unrest. A large anti-Mosaddeq crowd organized by Kashani, the Somka party, and pro-Zahedi military officers gathered at the Shah's palace and marched toward Mosaddeq's home, calling for his removal. Violent clashes then took place with a larger, pro-Mosaddeq crowd. The U.S. embassy reported that the "present probability is that the Mosaddeq Government will fall (51). Mosaddeq managed to evade the hostile crowd, however, and loyal army units eventually restored order.

A similar incident occurred in late April, when the chief of the National Police, General Afshartous, was kidnapped and murdered. MI6 had planned the kidnapping in order to provoke a coup, but had not intended that Afshartous would be murdered. Zahedi, Baqai, and several of their associates (including Kashani's son) were implicated in the killing, and warrants were issued for their arrest. Kashani, as president of the Majlis, helped Zahedi avoid arrest by giving him bast, or sanctuary, in the Majlis; Baqai was protected by parliamentary immunity. Mosaddeq charged that the conspirators had also intended to kill the defense and foreign ministers and that their goal was to install Baqai as Prime Minister. Afshartous had been regarded as courageous, uncorrupted, and staunchly loyal to Mosaddeq. His murder was a severe blow to the morale of the National Front and demonstrated clearly the ruthlessness of the conspirators’ (52).

These events added considerably to the turmoil that had gripped Iran since the summer of 1952. After the February riots, rumors of a coup circulated in the army and unrest continued to simmer among the Bakhtiari. The pro-Mosaddeq Qashqai tribe made plans to attack the Bakhtiari and march on Tehran in the event of a coup. The Tudeh had been very active in the February riots and remained so in the weeks that followed, leading Mosaddeq to order a wave of arrests. Despite its increased visibility, however, the Tudeh apparently did not gain in strength during this period (53). More significantly, Mosaddeq's once-unchallenged position as leader of the nationalist movement grew increasingly precarious. As discussed above, key 'National Front figures such as Kashani, Baqai, and Makki had been conspiring against Mosaddeq since the summer of 1952. Inasmuch as these figures held great sway over the urban lower classes, this weakened Mosaddeq's base of popular support. The defection of these leaders into the opposition also undermined Mosaddeq's position in the Majlis. Kashani, as speaker of the Majlis, had tried to oust Mosaddeq in January 1953. After the incidents of February and April 1953, Majlis debates over the causes of the February incident and Baqai's role in the murder of Afshartous served as forums for further attacks against Mosaddeq. By the summer of 1953, battle lines had clearly been drawn between Mosaddeq and his supporters in the Iran party and the Third Force, on the one hand, and Zahedi, Kashani, Baqai, and their allies, on the other (54).

While Zahedi and his associates were carrying out these attacks on Mosaddeq, the new Eisenhower administration began seriously to consider the idea of a coup. As mentioned above, top CIA officials had already decided that a coup was necessary. Since the November 1952 elections, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had been discussing the idea with his brother, Allen Dulles, who had been named director of the CIA. Top U.S. and British officials met on February 3, 1953, only two weeks after Eisenhower's inauguration, to review the situation. A decision was taken at this meeting to develop and implement a plan o overthrow Mosaddeq and install Zahedi. The operation was to be led by Roosevelt, and was given the code name AJAX. U.S. officials had previously described Zahedi as "unscrupulous" and "an opportunist"; now he was viewed as a strong figure who could take decisive steps to bring Iran back firmly into the Western camp (55).

Roosevelt traveled to Iran several times in the following months to prepare for the coup. He and another CIA officer met frequently with Zahedi in this period and financial assistance may have been provided to Zahedi. An American Iran specialist working under contract for the CIA was sent to Nicosia in mid-May to develop a detailed plan for the coup with an Iran specialist from MI6. The American then went over the plan with Roosevelt in Beirut. The two flew to London in mid-June to discuss the plan with British officials. Final approval came at a June 25 State Department meeting (56).

The coup plan had four main components. First, the propaganda and political action capabilities of BEDAMN were to be turned immediately against Mosaddeq. Second, opposition figures were to be encouraged to create a disturbance that would dramatize the situation by taking bast in the Majlis. Third, since the Shah had not been consulted about the coup, his agreement to dismiss Mosaddeq and appoint Zahedi was to be obtained. Finally, the support of key active-duty military officers was to be sought. The idea of a Bakhtiari uprising was dropped, presumably because Abul Qasem had recently been arrested.

These efforts were to be carried out with the help of the Rashidian and BEDAMN networks and several officers in the Tehran CIA station. The Rashidians had been turned over to the CIA by MI6 when the British left Tehran in November 1952. The CIA station was augmented for AJAX. A former journalist who had covered the Azerbaijan crisis and knew many prominent Iranians replaced the station chief (who had opposed the coup). A CIA paramilitary specialist with recent experience in Korea was brought in and given responsibility for liaison with the Iranian military officers involved in the plot.

Mosaddeq's position grew more precarious in June and July of 1953. Demonstrations by pro and anti-Mosaddeq crowds and the Tudeh occurred almost daily. The Majlis was the scene of continual disputes between pro and anti Mosaddeq forces over issues such as the February riots, Baqai's role in the Afshartous killing, control over the army, and elections for a new speaker. Fistfights broke out in the Majlis in early June. On July 1, Mosaddeq achieved a major victory over his opponents when Abdullah Moazami, a Mosaddeq supporter, was elected by a vote of 41 to 31 to replace Kashani as speaker. After further attacks by the opposition, a group of Mosaddeq supporters resigned en masse from the Majlis in protest. In late July, a group of deputies loyal to Haerizadeh and Baqai took bast in the Majlis. With the Majlis thus paralyzed, Mosaddeq decided to close it and seek new elections. Because of the opposition's threat to prevent a quorum, Mosaddeq was forced to hold a public referendum on the issue in early August. The referendum was rigged which caused a great public outcry against Mosaddeq (57).

The United States by this time had thoroughly committed itself to undermining Mosaddeq through BEDAMN. ClA participants have described this as "an orchestrated program of destabilization" and "an all-out effort."(58) BEDAMN was at least partially responsible for the demonstrations and Majlis activity that plagued Mosaddeq at this time (59). As with the anti-Mosaddeq BEDAMN activities described previously, it is impossible to gauge how effective these actions really were; but it seems safe to assume that they were significant. Several efforts were made in this period to persuade the Shah to back Zahedi. Henderson met with the Shah on May 30. The Shah told him that Zahedi was not an "intellectual giant," but that he would be acceptable if he had broad support, would come to power through parliamentary means, and would be given "massive economic aid" by the United States or Britain (60).

A second attempt was made in late July. An U.S. Army colonel and an MI6 officer were sent to France to locate Princess Ashraf, the Shah's twin sister, who was gambling at the casinos in Deauville. Ashraf agreed to speak to her brother after receiving an unauthorized promise that he would be supported in the style to which he was accustomed by the United States if the coup failed. Ashraf arrived in Tehran on July 25, but Mosaddeq prevented her from seeing her brother. (61) A third attempt was made a week later by U.S. Army General Norman Schwartzkopf, who had commanded the Iranian Gendarmerie in 1942-1948. Schwartzkopf managed to see the Shah, who refused to commit himself to the CIA plan. Schwartzkopf then advised Roosevelt to see the Shah personally. Arrangements were made through the Rashidians. The Shah agreed to support the plan after official U.S. and British involvement had been confirmed through a special radio broadcast (62). Having obtained the Shah's concurrence, Roosevelt's team was now able to go ahead with the coup. Firmans (royal decrees) dismissing Mosaddeq and appointing Zahedi were drawn up and signed by the Shah. On the night of Saturday, August 15, Colonel Nematollah Nassiri, commander of the Imperial Guard, delivered the firman dismissing Mosaddeq to him. Mosaddeq had been warned of the plot, probably by the Tudeh; he denounced the firman as a forgery and had Nassiri arrested. Troops loyal to Mosaddeq set up roadblocks throughout the city. Opposition deputies, military officers suspected of plotting with Zahedi, and the Shah's minister of court were arrested. A massive search was begun for Zahedi and a reward of 100,000 rials was offered for his arrest. Armored forces that had been assigned to move into Tehran in conjunction with the delivery of the firmans failed to arrive. Without informing Roosevelt's team, the Shah fled the country in panic, first to Baghdad and then to Rome. (63)

The arrest of Nassiri completely disrupted the original coup plan, forcing Roosevelt and his team to improvise a new strategy. Contingency plans were made for Roosevelt, Zahedi, and a few other key participants to be evacuated in an U.S. military attach�’s airplane. Zahedi was brought to a CIA safe house, where he remained in hiding until Mosaddeq was finally overthrown. Roosevelt’s team in the hope that a second, successful coup could be triggered then undertook a number of diverse and uncoordinated actions.

The first was an effort to publicize the Shah's dismissal of Mosaddeq and appointment of Zahedi. Copies of the firmans were made by CIA officers on Sunday, August 16, and distributed by Nerren and Cilley and two American newspaper reporters. Since Mosaddeq had not publicly announced receipt of the firman, this served to publicize the Shah's actions. The two reporters were taken to meet Ardeshir Zahedi at the house of one of the CIA officers. Ardeshir told them about the firmans and characterized Mosaddeq's attempt to arrest his father as a coup, since the latter had been appointed legally. This information was quickly published in The New York Times and elsewhere. (64) After the firmans were distributed, efforts were made to generate support for Zahedi in the military. A declaration calling for the armed forces to support the Shah was drawn up and circulated. Military supplies were distributed to pro-Zahedi forces by the U.S. military advisory mission. Efforts were also made to gain the support of garrisons in other cities. Messengers were sent to Kermanshah and Isfahan, using forged travel documents previously obtained from CIA headquarters. Colonel Teimur Bakhtiar, the garrison commander at Kermanshah, led a column of tanks and armored cars toward Tehran. The Isfahan commander refused to cooperate, however (65).

As these events were unfolding, Nerren and Cilley hired a large crowd to march into central Tehran on Monday, August 17, shouting Tudeh slogans and carrying signs denouncing the Shah. This "fake" Tudeh crowd, which was paid for with $50,000 given to Nerren and Cilley by a ClA officer the previous evening, was designed to provoke fears of a Tudeh takeover and thus rally support for Zahedi. Real Tudeh members, who were not aware that it was a CIA provocation, soon joined the crowd. The combined crowd attacked the Reza Shah mausoleum and tore down statues of the Shah and his father. These demonstrations continued on the following day, leading Henderson to demand that the police break them up. The police were still in their barracks at this time. In what was to be a fateful decision, Mosaddeq acquiesced. The Tudeh retaliated by ordering its cadres off the street. On Wednesday, most of the police were to turn against Mosaddeq, while Tudeh crowds remained off the streets and did not attack the pro-Zahedi crowds that appeared on that day (66). Once the firmans had been publicized and steps had been taken to rally the military behind Zahedi, Roosevelt's team began to look for ways to trigger an uprising against Mosaddeq. The most obvious way to do this was through the clergy, preferably through a popular figure such as Kashani. The CIA team had to direct ties with Kashani, so the Rashidians were asked to make such an arrangement through their allies among the clergy. The Rashidians reported back that such an uprising could not be arranged until Friday, when weekly prayers would be held. Fearing that Mosaddeq's net would soon close in around them, Roosevelt asked the Rashidians how he could contact Kashani. He was directed to a Rashidian ally named Ahmad Aramesh. Two ClA officers met with Aramesh on the morning of Wednesday, August 19, and gave him $10,000 to pass on to Kashani. Kashani then apparently arranged to have an anti-Mosaddeq crowd march from the bazaar area into central Tehran. Similar crowds were probably organized independently by the Rashidians and by Nerren and Cilley, possibly through Ayatollah Behbehani and a mob organizer named Shaban Bimokh(67). This crowd was joined by army and police units and by onlookers who were angered by the "Tudeh" demonstrations of the previous days or had become disillusioned with Mosaddeq. Government office buildings and the offices of pro Mosaddeq newspapers and political parties were attacked. Mosaddeq refused to send the army or police to break up this crowd. A pro-Zahedi army detachment seized the radio station and began to broadcast pro-Zahedi bulletins. Air Force General Guilanshah led a column of tanks to the CIA safe house where Zahedi was hiding. Together with a group of pro-Shah demonstrators, these forces then seized the army headquarters and marched on Mosaddeq's home. There a nine-hour battle ensued in which some 300 people were killed. The walls around Mosaddeq's house were destroyed with tank and artillery fire. The house was stormed, and Mosaddeq escaped over the roof. He surrendered to Zahedi the next day.

APPRAISAL OF THE U.S. ROLE IN THE COUP

The three questions posed in the introduction to this study can now be answered. What motives led U.S. policy makers to overthrow Mosaddeq? It is often argued that the main motive behind the coup was the desire of U.S. policy makers to help U.S. oil companies gain a share in Iranian oil production.(68) On the face of it, this argument has considerable merit. The Eisenhower administration was certainly favorable to U.S. business interests, and the Dulles brothers' law firm had often represented U.S. oil companies in legal matters. Moreover, the final agreement worked out in 1954 with the Zahedi government gave U.S. companies a 40% share in Iranian oil production, which had previously been controlled by the British. While this view cannot entirely be refuted, it seems more plausible to argue that U.S. policymakers were motivated mainly by fears of a communist takeover in Iran, and that the involvement of U.S. companies was sought mainly to prevent this from occurring. The Cold War was at its height in the early 1950s, and the Soviet Union was viewed as an expansionist power seeking world domination. Eisenhower had made the Soviet threat a key issue in the 1952 elections, accusing the Democrats of being soft on communism and of having "lost China." Once in power, the new administration quickly sought to put its views into practice: the State Department was purged of homosexuals and suspected communists, steps were taken to strengthen the Western alliance, and initiatives were begun to bolster the Western position in Latin America, the Middle East, and East Asia. Viewed in this context, and coming as it did only two weeks after Eisenhower's inauguration, the decision to overthrow Mosaddeq appears merely as one more step in the global effort of the Eisenhower administration to block Soviet expansionism. (69) Moreover, the major U.S. oil companies were not interested in Iran at this time. A glut existed in the world oil market. The U.S. majors had increased their production in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in 1951 in order to make up for the loss of Iranian production; operating in Iran would force them to cut back production in these countries which would create tensions with Saudi and Kuwaiti leaders. Furthermore, if nationalist sentiments remained high in Iran, production there would be risky. U.S. oil companies had shown no interest in Iran in 1951 and 1952. By late 1952, the Truman administration had come to believe that participation by U.S. companies in the production of Iranian oil was essential to maintain stability in Iran and keep Iran out of Soviet hands. In order to gain the participation of the major U.S. oil companies, Truman offered to scale back a large anti-trust case then being brought against them. The Eisenhower administration shared Truman's views on the participation of U.S. companies in Iran and also agreed to scale back the anti-trust case. Thus, not only did U.S. majors not want to participate in Iran at this time, it took a major effort by U.S. policymakers to persuade them to become involved. (70) The Eisenhower administration therefore seems to have been motivated mainly by fears of a communist takeover in Iran rather than by a desire to promote U.S. commercial interest. It should be noted that most middle level State Department and CIA officials did not believe that a coup was necessary to avert a communist takeover. Neither Henry Byroade, the Assistant Secretary of State with responsibility for the Middle East, not Ambassador Henderson favored a coup in early 1953. As discussed above, Iran specialists in the CIA analysts did not regard Mosaddeq as a communist and the Tudeh was not believed to be capable of seizing power at this time. Rather, the Tudeh was thought to be pursuing a "popular front" strategy by infiltrating the army and the government bureaucracy and trying to gain favor with Mosaddeq and other National Front leaders. CIA analysts had concluded in November 1952 that a Tudeh takeover was not likely before the end of 1953. Moreover, the Iranian economy had become relatively stable by this time, so a general collapse was not viewed as imminent. The fears of a communist takeover that prompted the coup therefore seem to have originated at the highest levels of the CIA and the State Department, and were not shared by lower-level Iran specialist. (71) What roles did Britain and the various Iranian participants play? The British role in the coup itself appears to have been limited to assistance in the formulation of the original coup plan and the contribution of the Rashidian network. The original plan, of course, had little bearing on how the coup actually occurred, the Rashidians do not seem to have played a particularly crucial role in the coup itself. Of much greater significance was the British role in undermining Mosaddeq's position throughout the time that he was Prime Minister. The British acted against Mosaddeq almost continuously, backing three major, protracted efforts to oust him. Britain also instituted an oil embargo and a variety of other economic sanctions against Iran. These activities were largely responsible for the dual erosion of Mosaddeq's base of support. The consequent erosion that occurred contributed to his downfall, and as such, these actions helped to bring out the overthrow of Mosaddeq. Four main groups of Iranians were involved in the coup. First, Zahedi and his immediate allies, including his son, Abul Qasem Bakhtiari, and military officers such as Hejazi, Nassiri, Guilanshah, and Bakhtiar played an obvious role. Zahedi and several of these figures had been conspiring against Mosaddeq for about a year before the coup; the others led military units or played important support roles in the coup itself. Second, former Mosaddeq allies such as Kashani and Baqai worked to undermine Mosaddeq's base of support in the year before the coup, and Kashani at least appears also to have played an important role in coup. Third, Nerren and Cilley and the Rashidians played key roles in carrying out the coup and in supervising anti-Mosaddeq activities in the period fore the coup. Finally, the Shah himself played a significant, although reluctant, role in acquiescing to the coup. (72) Beyond these specific people, a relatively small indeterminate number of Iranians either volunteered or were hired to participate in anti-Mosaddeq demonstrations and other activities. How important was the U.S. role in overthrowing Mosaddeq? Although it is impossible to give a definitive answer to this question, the evidence presented here suggests that the coup could not have occurred at the time and in the manner it did without considerable U.S. assistance. U.S. officials planned and directed the coup, and financed it with at least $60,000. (73) Zahedi, its nominal leader, hid in a CIA safe house until the coup was virtually completed. The Shah was not consulted about the decision to undertake the coup, about its manner of execution, or about the candidate chosen to replace Mosaddeq; he was also quite reluctant to support the coup and fled the country at the first sign of failure. Moreover, the anti-Mosaddeq actions undertaken by the United States through BEDAMN in the year before the coup had played a key role in preparing the groundwork for it by undermining Mosaddeq's base of support.

However, it is possible that Zahedi or other Iranians, at a later date, could have overthrown Mosaddeq. Yet only three groups appear to have been capable of overthrowing Mosaddeq. First, Zahedi and his allies might conceivably have been able to oust Mosaddeq without U.S. help. Although a solo coup by Zahedi and his allies cannot entirely be ruled out, it seems unlikely that such an effort would have succeeded. Zahedi had been trying unsuccessfully for almost a year to overthrow Mosaddeq. He did not have substantial popular support, and the Shah refused to back him without a commitment from the United States. Moreover, warrants had been issued for Zahedi's arrest that forced him to operate clandestinely.

A second possibility is that Kashani or some other popular figure might have seized power by cooping Mosaddeq's base of support. As discussed above, Mosaddeq's popularity had declined considerably by the summer of 1953 primarily because of the defection of Kashani and other National Front leaders. However, while Kashani had been a legitimate contender for the premiership in late 1952, his star had since faded. He had lost much of his support by breaking with Mosaddeq and associating himself with Zahedi. This is evidenced by his defeat in the July 1953 elections for the Majlis speakership and by his virtual disappearance from Iranian politics after the coup. (74) Although Baqai might once have been able to challenge Mosaddeq, he too had been tarnished by his attacks on Mosaddeq and by his alleged role in the Afshartous murder. No other opposition figure had the popular support necessary to displace Mosaddeq as leader of the nationalist movement at this time.

A third possibility is that the Tudeh party might have overthrown Mosaddeq, either in a coup or through the gradual infiltration and subversion of the government. The Tudeh was, however, still much weaker than it had been at its peak in 1946. The U.S. embassy was deliberately overstating both the strength of the Tudeh and the degree to which Mosaddeq was cooperating with it in its public statements in this period.

Since U.S. officials were the main source of negative information on the Tudeh, this suggests that the threat of a Tudeh takeover was widely overestimated in Iran at this time. (75) The Tudeh had decided against a coup as recently as April 1953, and the CIA regarded a Tudeh takeover as unlikely at least until the end of 1953. (76) While a Tudeh seizure of power through popular front tactics cannot be ruled out, this was at best a distant prospect. The Tudeh had no representatives in the Mosaddeq government and was still illegal and thus forced to operate clandestinely. Most Iranians were very wary of the Tudeh. Mosaddeq had taken strong measures against the Tudeh as late as August 18, 1953, and presumably would have blocked any direct threat by the Tudeh as he had those of Qavam, Zahedi, and Kashani. Moreover, it can be assumed that the United States and Britain would have used force to prevent any serious attempt by the Tudeh to seize power.

Not only was a coup unlikely without U.S. helps, but Mosaddeq's position at this time was not as precarious as is commonly believed. Although the Iranian economic situation had been described by U.S. analysts as "desperate" in late 1951, stimulative fiscal policies begun in the summer of 1952 had produced a modest recovery by the end of the year. Efforts were made to sell oil to countries such as Japan and Italy in early 1953. Business was described as "brisk" in May 1953 by the U.S. commercial attach� in Tehran, and both agriculture and non oil exports were reported to be doing well. (77) Moreover, Mosaddeq still retained considerable support at this time in organizations such as the Iran party and the Third Force, among the urban lower and middle classes in general, and in the military.

CONCLUSION

Based on recently released diplomatic records and on interviews with many key participants, this study has presented an account of the 1953 coup in Iran that is more complete than others that have so far appeared. The main details presented here that have not appeared elsewhere are: (1) the British efforts to oust Mosaddeq in the period before the coup; (2) the closely related British efforts to undermine Mosaddeq through covert action carried out by the Rashidians; (3) similar U.S. efforts to undermine Mosaddeq through BEDAMN; (4) Zahedi's activities in the year before the coup; and (5) several key details of the coup itself, such as the formulation of the original plan, the decision to evacuate after the original attempt failed, the U.S. role in organizing the "fake" Tudeh demonstrations, and the roles of Aramesh and (apparently) Kashani in organizing the crowds that stormed Mosaddeq's home on August 19. These new details clear up some of the errors and omissions that appear in Roosevelt's account. They also strengthen Roosevelt's implicit contention that the U.S. role in the coup was decisive. After the coup, the Shah reportedly told Roosevelt "I owe my throne to God, my people, my army - and to you." (78) Although each of these forces may have played a role in the coup, this statement would have been more accurate if the Shah had reversed their order of importance.

The 1953 coup ended the slow, halting progress that Iran had been making since the early 1900s toward a more representative form of government and toward freedom from foreign interference. These two aspirations were embodied in Mosaddeq's movement; with the coup, he became a martyr to these causes. In the years after the coup, an authoritarian regime was gradually consolidated in Iran with massive assistance from the United States. Martial law was instituted and remained in effect for several years. Thousands of National Front and Tudeh supporters were arrested. Pro-Mosaddeq demonstrations in the Tehran bazaar and at Tehran University were broken up. A successor to the National Front known as the National Resistance Movement was suppressed. The Qashqai tribe was attacked and its leaders were sent into exile. Press censorship was instituted. A secret police force was established that soon evolved into the notorious SAVAK. Majlis elections in February 1954 were blatantly rigged.(79) Except during a brief period in the early 1960s, the instruments of dictatorship were kept firmly in place until the Iranian revolution began to unfold in 1978. By then, any hope of establishing a democratic alternative to the Shah had long since been lost

Last changed: September 21, 2007

Re: Khatami

From: mohannad
Date: 19 Jun 2004
Time: 00:44:04
Remote Name: 212.118.10.154

Comments

long live palestine

Part Two

en linea blackjack juegopbcn69

Comments

Blowjob Ninjas

Comments

Hoodia

Comments

Thank you

Comments

nokia ringtones

Comments

viagra pharmacy

Comments

free government credit reports in credit report check

Comments

gay boy

Comments

online soma

Comments

Soma carisoprodol3349

Comments

Great work

Comments

Great work

Comments

Insurance dallas

Comments

FREE SEX

Comments

Thank you

Comments

Comments

Sponsored by the Arizona Persian Page - Please visit often.

Last changed: September 21, 2007

Re: Khatami

Comments