Part One

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Part One

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From: The 1953 Coup D' ETAT in Iran
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Part one...

Today, August 19, 1998 is the 45th anniversary of the US backed Coup D’Etat to overthrow Dr. Mossadeq’s democratic government in Iran. The following article is one of the best research documents on this matter.

THE 1953 COUP D'ETAT IN IRAN

By Mark J. Gasiorowski Department of Political Science Louisiana State University

1- INTRODUCTION 2- THE ANGLO-IRANIAN OIL CRISIS AND BRITISH POLICY TOWARD IRAN 3- U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN UNDER THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION 4- THE OVERTHROW OF MOSADDEQ 5- AN APPRAISAL OF THE U.S. ROLE IN THE COUP 6- CONCLUSION 7- NOTES

I N T R O D U C T I O N

In retrospect, the United States sponsored coup d'etat in Iran of August 19, 1953, has emerged as a critical event in postwar world history. The government of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq which was ousted in the coup was the last popular, democratically oriented government to hold office in Iran. The regime replacing it was a dictatorship that suppressed all forms of popular political activity, producing tensions that contributed greatly to the 1978-1979 Iranian revolution. If Mosaddeq had not been overthrown, the revolution might not have occurred. The 1953 coup also marked the first peacetime use of covert action by the United States to overthrow a foreign government. As such, it was an important precedent for events like the 1954 coup in Guatemala and the 1973 overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile(1), and made the United States a key target of the Iranian revolution.

Although the 1953 coup is thus an important historical event, its story has not yet been fully told. The most widely circulated account of the coup, that of Kermit Roosevelt, the CIA officer who directed it, contains many errors and omissions(2). This study seeks to clarify the roles played by the United States and Britain in the coup, based on recently released diplomatic records and on inter views with most of the key U.S. and British participants(3). This account is more complete than Roosevelt's and the others that have so far appeared. Moreover, because all of the major U.S. and British participants who are alive and willing to speak on the subject have been interviewed for this study, and because all of the currently available U.S. and British diplomatic records dealing with the coup have been examined, this study is likely to remain the most complete account of U.S. and British involvement in the coup for some time to come.

Three main questions guide this study. First, why did the United States become involved in the coup? Second, what roles did Britain and the various Iranian participants play? Third, how important was the U.S. role in the overthrow of Mosaddeq? While none of these questions can be answered definitively, the material presented in this study sheds considerable light on each.

THE ANGLO-IRANIAN OIL CRISIS AND BRITISH POLICY TOWARD IRAN

On April 29, 1951, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the late Shah of Iran, yielded to a rising tide of popular pressure and appointed Mohammad Mosaddeq to be it's new prime minister. Mosaddeq was a lawyer and wealthy landowner who had been a prominent political figure in Iran since the early 1900s. In his long years in public service, Mosaddeq had gained a reputation as a liberal democrat and an ardent nationalist. By the late 1940s, he had identified himself with two main issues: a desire to transfer political power from the royal court to the parliament (known as the Majlis), and a desire to increase Iran's control over its oil industry, which was controlled by the British-owned Anglo-lranian Oil Company (AIOC). In the late 1940s, these two issues were becoming increasingly prominent in Iranian politics. Moreover, they had become closely interrelated by this time: the British had become extremely powerful in Iran, due mainly to their control over the oil industry, and they used their power in part to help the Shah; the Shah, for his part, was widely viewed as a British puppet and had refused to renegotiate or nationalize the AIOC concession(4).

These two issues came to eclipse all others in 1949, when a new oil agreement favorable to the AIOC was announced and when the Shah then tried to rig the 16th Majlis elections. These actions enraged the opposition. Large demonstrations ensued and an organization known as the National Front was formed to coordinate opposition to the Shah and to the British. Mosaddeq soon emerged its de facto leader.

The National Front was a broad coalition of groups and political parties based mainly on the urban middle and lower classes. Its main components were the progressive, nationalist Iran party, led by Karim Sanjabi and Allahyar Saleh and composed mainly of leftist, anti-Soviet intellectuals; the Toilers' party, led by Mozaffar Baqai and Khalel Maleki and composed of both workers and leftist intellectuals; and the Mojahidin-i-Islam, led by Ayatollah Abul Qassem Kashani and composed mainly of workers, bazaar merchants, and rank-and-file clergy. Associated with the National Front (but not formally affiliated with it) was the Pan-Iranist party, a shadowy, ultra-nationalist group composed mainly of lower class toughs. The National Front also attracted a large number of unaffiliated individuals, particularly among the middle class. The main opposition organizations not affiliated with the National Front were the communist Tudeh party and Fedayin-i-Islam.(5).

In 1950, the National Front led frequent demonstrations against the Shah and the British. It also managed to elected eight candidates to the 16th Majlis, including Mosaddeq. Once in the Majlis, the National Front deputies continued to press for a reduction of the Shah's powers and, after June 1950, for nationalization of the oil industry. In March 1951, Mosaddeq submitted a bill calling for nationalization of the oil industry to the Majlis. This bill was quickly passed, and Mosaddeq was soon appointed prime minister. On May 1, immediately after taking office, Mosaddeq signed the nationalization bill into law(6).

The nationalization law quickly brought Mosaddeq into direct conflict with e British government, which owned 50% of the AIOC's stock and was not prepared to accept outright nationalization. In the ensuing months, the British adopted a three-track strategy designed to reestablish their control over Iran's oil either pressuring Mosaddeq into a favorable settlement or by removing him from office(7).

The first component of this strategy consisted of a series of legal maneuvers. The International Court of Justice was asked to arbitrate the oil dispute. A negotiating team was sent to Tehran with a proposal that recognized the principle of nationalization but called for the AIOC to market Iran's oil on a 50-50 profit sharing basis. This proposal was rejected by Mosaddeq in June 1951. Negotiations were reopened in August under a mission led-by Richard Stokes. Stokes's proposal differed little from the previous British offer, and was soon rejected by Mosaddeq. The British thereafter refused to negotiate directly with Mosaddeq and relied instead on appeals to the International Court, the United Nations, and on mediation by the United States(8). The second component of the British strategy was to undermine Mosaddeq's base of support by imposing economic sanctions on Iran and carrying out military maneuvers in the region. The AIOC began a production slowdown in May and prevented tankers from loading oil at Abadan. By the end of July, these steps had evolved into a full-fledged blockade, which was joined by the other major oil companies. A British paratroops brigade was sent to Cyprus in mid-May and the cruiser Mauritius was sent to Abadan. These actions led Mosaddeq to announce that the first shot fired would "signal the start of World War III(9). With the collapse of the Stokes negotiations, the AIOC announced that it would take legal action against anyone buying Iranian oil. Britain asked its European allies to discourage their citizens from seeking employment with the newly-formed National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). In early September, an embargo was begun on British exports to Iran of iron, steel, sugar, oil processing equipment, and goods that could be resold for dollars. Twenty thousand oil workers were laid off by the AIOC at Abadan, forcing Mosaddeq to put them on the government payroll. Sterling conversion privileges were canceled and other financial restrictions were imposed which violated a memorandum of under standing between the two governments. Four British destroyers joined the Mauritius in September and held firing practice near Abadan. British land and air forces in the region were also strengthened.(10)

The third component of the British strategy was to try to remove Mosaddeq from office. This was to be achieved mainly through covert political action, undertaken with the help of a network of pro-British politicians, businessmen, military officers, and religious figures. The principal figures in this network were the Rashidian brothers, who had been the main British agents in Iran since the early 1940s. Another important element in the British net was a group of prominent, pro-British politicians. These included Sayyid Zia Tabataba'i, whom the British sought to install as prime minister, and Jamal Emami, who headed a pro-British faction in the Majlis.(11)

The British began to pressure the Shah to install Sayyid Zia even before Mosaddeq came to power. The Shah was apparently agreeable, and was reportedly discussing the matter with Sayyid Zia when the Majlis nominated Mosaddeq. These efforts continued after Mosaddeq assumed office. In June 1951, Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden, leaders of the Conservative opposition in Britain, suggested to the Foreign Office that an Anglo-American approach made to the Shah to oust Mosaddeq. This meant, in their words, carrying out "a coup"(12). Plans for covert action had, however, already been developed by this time; the removal of Mosaddeq was viewed as "objective number one"(13). Oddly enough, several members of the British parliament began to lobby the Foreign Office at this time on behalf of Ahmad Qavam, a venerable Iranian politician and former prime minister. The Foreign Office responded that "certain other plans are now under way" and "we have our money on another horse," referring Sayyid Zia (14). Throughout the summer of 1951, pressure to remove Mosaddeq was brought to bear on the Shah, who was sympathetic but remained paralyzed with indecision(15).

After the collapse of the Stokes negotiations, all available means were used in attempting to oust Mosaddeq. Stokes met with the Shah shortly after the negotiations broke down and implored him to dismiss Mosaddeq. The Permanent Undersecretary in the Foreign Office called for an "indirect and behind the scenes" effort to remove Mosaddeq and noted "an encouraging growth of opposition in the Majlis"(16). This was a reference to efforts by Jamal Emami and his faction to disrupt the Majlis. The Foreign Office developed a set of guidelines for dealing with Mosaddeq's successor, whom it presumed would be Sayyid Zia. These included a loan from the AIOC and a modus vivendi agreed to by Sayyid Zia calling for a return of the AIOC under a different name. The Minister of Fuel and Power optimistically speculated that these measures might just enable Britain to avoid full ationalization (17 ).

These efforts were taken one step further in early September by the British Ambassador in Tehran, Sir Francis Shepherd, who reported that the Shah was in favor of a change of government and the opposition was about to overthrow Mosaddeq. The Foreign Office then announced that the oil negotiations had been suspended and that it saw no hope of reaching an agreement with Mosaddeq. This statement, which was "designed to encourage the opposition group headed by Sayyid Zia," led Mosaddeq to accuse the British of trying to overthrow him(18).

The actions of the British government, as discussed above, were accompanied y a new round of further British economic sanctions and military activities. The United States protested vigorously; U.S. policymakers believed that Mosaddeq was "anxious to reach an agreement," and advised the British to negotiate(19 ). The British decided instead to increase their pressure on Mosaddeq. After British workers were expelled from the oil fields on September 20, plans were made to invade Abadan. The Iranian naval commander at Abadan was persuaded by the British to put up only token resistance. Prime Minister Attlee notified President Truman of the invasion plan. Truman responded that the United States would not support an invasion and again recommended negotiations. Attlee was then forced to tell his cabinet that "in view of the attitude of the United States Government, [he did not] think it would be expedient to use force to maintain the British staff in Abadan"(20).

U.S. opposition caused the British to abandon their attempt to overthrow Mosaddeq at this time. The oil dispute was then brought before the United Nations, where Mosaddeq received a warm reception from U.S. officials and gained considerable sympathy in the international community. Having failed to reverse the nationalization law or to oust Mosaddeq, and with their main candidate for the premiership by now thoroughly discredited, the British began to search for other options in Iran.

One soon materialized. Ahmad Qavam, whose overtures had been rejected earlier in 1951, sent several emissaries to the British in late 1951 and early 1952. In March 1952, Julian Amery, a Conservative MP with considerable experience in the Middle East, was sent unofficially to Paris to meet with Qavam. Qavam then returned to Tehran to build support for his candidacy. A list of possible cabinet ministers was drawn up and given to the British for approval. Support was given to Qavam in the form of help from pro-British Majlis members and an agreement on a plan to end the oil dispute. Qavam told George Middleton, the British Charge in Tehran, that he would "ensure that the traditionally cordial relations [between Iran and Britain] were restored, that he wanted [the British] back as partners in the oil industry, that the British must return, and so on"(21). He met in early June with U.S. Ambassador Loy Henderson. Henderson was "inclined to think that he might be the best bet" as a successor to Mosaddeq, although State Department officials were less enthusiastic(22). By this time the British had also begun a covert effort through the Rashidians to create friction among the leaders of the National Front. Tensions emerged as early as March 1952, when Mosaddeq openly criticized Kashani's attempts to rig the 17th Majlis elections. Tensions also emerged at this time between Mosaddeq and Hossein Makki, another key National Front figure. Robin Zaehner, an Oxford professor working for MI6 (the British intelligence service) in Iran at this time, claimed that this tension was "created and directed by the brothers Rashidian"(23). It is, of course, impossible to determine how important these British actions were in creating these tensions, but they may well have played a significant role.

Mosaddeq was evidently aware of these activities. He retaliated suddenly on July 16 by resigning from office, after clashing with the Shah over who would control the military. The Shah then appointed Qavam prime minister. Plans for Qavam's accession had apparently not yet been completed. Massive demonstrations calling for Mosaddeq's return were organized by the National Front. These demonstrations became violent; at least 69 people were killed and over 750 were injured. The Shah refused to use the police to crush the demonstrations. Since Qavam had no popular following, Mosaddeq's supporters dominated the streets of Tehran and other cities. Mosaddeq was triumphantly swept back into office on July 21. These events had ominous ramifications. Morale in the army dropped precipitously, particularly after Mosaddeq subsequently purged the officer corps. The British and their supporters were panic-stricken. Middleton reported that the court had been "fatally weakened," and that henceforth it might not be possible "to stop the drift towards communism." He described July 21 as "a turning point in Iranian history. Previously the small ruling class determined the prime minister, with [the] Shah as umpire. Now the consent of the mob is the decisive factor"(25).

The Qavam episode also created serious problems for the National Front. The Tudeh party was becoming increasingly powerful; efforts were made to bring it under control. Mosaddeq quarreled bitterly with Kashani and other National Front leaders over cabinet appointments and over Mosaddeq's request for emergency powers. The Pan-Iranist party began to split into factions. More ominously, a group of military officers led by Fazlollah Zahedi began to plot with the Rashidians against Mosaddeq. Zahedi, a retired general and member of the Senate who also headed the Retired Officers' Association, had been arrested by the British in 1941 for planning "a concentrated move against allied troops in Persia"(26).

He had been a minister in Mosaddeq's first cabinet and had supported the National Front until the July uprisings,(27) when the resurgence of Tudeh activity and the disintegration of the military apparently drove him into opposition.

Zahedi and the Rashidians began to plot against Mosaddeq shortly after the latter returned to office on July 21. A Kashani emissary and National Front leaders Makki, Baqai, and Abol Hassan Haerizadeh approached Zahedi and expressed their dissatisfaction with Mosaddeq. Zahedi apparently gained Kashani's support in exchange for a role in the selection of post-coup cabinet members. From this point on, Kashani, Makki, Baqai, and Haerizadeh worked against Mosaddeq in loose collaboration with Zahedi and were among Mosaddeq's staunchest opponents. Zahedi met with a British embassy official and expressed his opposition to the growth of U.S. influence in Iran. The embassy officer cabled London for advice, saying "I don't want to set [the Rashidians] off working up a coup d'etat and then have to call it off"(23).

Zahedi spent August and September trying to build support. He obtained the backing of Abul Qasem Bakhtiari, a tribal leader with whom he had worked closely for the Nazis during World War II. Zahedi met with Middleton and asked for assurances that the British would not oppose him, would obtain U.S. acquiescence in the plot, and would agree to an oil settlement on terms similar to those reached with Qavam. Middleton reported this to London and was told to give Zahedi assistance. Arms were provided to the Bakhtiari by MI6. Middleton met with U.S. Ambassador Henderson, who was noncommittal about Zahedi. Either Zahedi or a close lieutenant also met with Henderson on September 8. Henderson was told that Mosaddeq could not stop the communists, but that a government which could would soon come to power(29).

As with the Qavam plot, Mosaddeq evidently learned of Zahedi's plans and moved to stop him before they could be implemented. Arrest warrants were issued on October 13 for the Rashidians and General Abdul Hossein Hejazi, a Zahedi ally who had been dismissed in August as head of the military college. A General Aryana was dismissed from the army in connection with the plot, and Zahedi was saved from arrest only by parliamentary immunity. Three days later, on October 16, Mosaddeq broke diplomatic relations with Britain(30). Lacking a base for operations inside Iran, the British henceforth were forced to rely on the United States to deal with Mosaddeq.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN UNDER THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION

In comparison with countries such as Germany, Italy, Greece, and China, Iran was not of great concern to U.S. policymakers in the late 1940s. The Tudeh party had been seriously weakened in the 1945-1946 Azerbaijan crisis and Iran was relatively stable. The United States had no significant economic interests in Iran at this time. Anglo-U.S. military strategy called for Britain rather than the United States to defend Iran in the event of a Soviet invasion(32). Very little U.S. aid was given to Iran in the 1940s. Because of its long border with the Soviet Union, Iran was of some interest for espionage and other covert activities. However, these were on a much smaller scale than similar activities elsewhere and did not really affect Iran itself.

In 1950, the gradual reemergence of the Tudeh and growing unrest caused by the oil dispute and a severe recession within Iran led U.S. policymakers to become increasingly concerned about Iran. The Shah's leadership ability was criticized. Iran was described as "dangerous and explosive," and a possible "second China"(33). Steps were taken to remedy the situation. A $23 million per year military aid agreement was signed. A small Point Four aid program was begun. A $25 million export-import Bank loan was approved (although never actually granted) and a $10 million International Bank loan request was sup ported. The CIA and embassy staffs in Tehran were increased. Henry Grady, who had played a key role in the Greek Civil War, was named Ambassador to Iran(34).

By early 1951, U.S. involvement in Iran had increased considerably. After the nationalization law was enacted, the Truman administration pursued two main goals regarding Iran. First, Iran was to be kept in the Western camp at all costs. Second, stability was to be maintained in the world oil market. These goals did not call for undermining the Mosaddeq government. U.S. officials stated that they had "no intention. . . of challenging Iran's sovereignty," and frequently expressed support for Iran's independence(35). Although a covert action program had been started in Iran by the Truman administration (see below), and while covert action had been used extensively elsewhere, this program was designed to weaken the Soviet position in Iran rather than that of Mosaddeq(36). U.S. policy toward Iran under Truman was to support the Mosaddeq government and seek an end to the oil dispute through diplomatic means. U.S. officials were, however, aware of British covert activities against Mosaddeq in this period and occasionally discussed these activities with their British counterparts(37). Soon after the AIOC was nationalized, U.S. officials developed a plan to ease the effect of the British oil blockade on U.S. allies. Under this plan, U.S. oil companies were asked to provide oil voluntarily to those allies that had been adversely affected by the blockade. Some 46 million barrels of oil were delivered under this plan in the first year of the blockade, which was estimated to be 20% of Iran's total 1950 production. Although it was undertaken to ensure that oil would be available to U.S. allies in the event of a general war,(38) this plan had the effect of strengthening the British blockade and hence inadvertently helped to undermine the Iranian economy and the Mosaddeq government. At the same time, diplomatic efforts were begun to try to resolve the oil dispute. U.S. officials called for a negotiated settlement and pledged not to interfere in Iran's internal affairs. The British were advised to pay "lip service" to the principle of nationalization, accept a 50-50 division of profits, and refrain from using force. British officials were "bothered" and "annoyed at the American attitude of relative indifference."(39) Averell Harriman was sent to Tehran after the first round of negotiations broke down to press for new talks. His efforts led to the Stokes negotiations. While these ultimately failed, Harriman is credited by Dean Acheson with preventing a war between Britain and Iran. After the Stokes mission collapsed, the British began their covert efforts to install Sayyid Zia. U.S. officials repeatedly pressed the British to resume negotiations(40). As discussed above, Truman's personal intervention was largely responsible for preventing a British invasion of Iran at this time. Mosaddeq went to the United Nations in October. He traveled to Washington and was received warmly by President Truman and other U.S. officials. Mean while, a new U.S. approach to the oil dispute was being developed. This plan recognized Iran's desire for an end to British control over its oil resources and distanced the United States considerably from the British. The U.S. proposal called for the establishment of a consortium to market oil purchased from the NIOC. This consortium was to be made up initially of Royal Dutch/Shell and other major oil companies. When anti-trust considerations led the U.S. majors to back out, a similar package was arranged involving independent U.S. oil companies. When this fell apart in the fall of 1952, a third plan was worked out in which anti-trust laws were to be waived to permit the participation of the U.S. majors. This package was rejected by Mosaddeq in late 1952, but was agreed to in essence by his successor in 1954.4' In conjunction with these diplomatic activities, the United States began covert efforts to monitor and manipulate the political process in Iran. Since the late 1940s, the CIA had been carrying out five basic types of covert activity in Iran. First, stay-behind networks had been organized among the tribes in southern Iran to conduct guerrilla warfare in the event of a Soviet invasion. Second, escape and evasion routes had been set up for use in a major war. Third, cross border espionage and subversion operations were being launched into the Soviet Union using Azerbaijanis, Armenians, and other ethnic groups living on both sides of the border. Fourth, Soviet activities in Iran were being monitored with espionage and counter-espionage operations. Finally, an operation codenamed BEDAMN had been started in 1948 to counter Soviet and Tudeh influence in Iran(42).

BEDAMN was a propaganda and political action program run through a network headed by two Iranians, codenamed Nerren and Cilley, and apparently funded at $1 million per year. Under the propaganda arm of BEDAMN, anti communist articles and cartoons were planted in Iranian newspapers, books(43) and leaflets critical of the Soviet Union and the Tudeh party were written and distributed, rumors were started, etc. The political action arm of BEDAMN involved both direct attacks on Soviet allies in Iran and so-called black operations designed to turn Iranians against the Tudeh. Attacks on Soviet allies typically involved hiring street gangs to break up Tudeh rallies and funding right-wing, anti-Communist organizations such as the Somka and Pan-lranist parties, who regularly battled Tudeh mobs in the streets of Tehran. Black operations included the infiltration of agents provocateurs into Tudeh demonstrations to provoke outrageous acts, paying religious figures to denounce the Tudeh as anti-Islamic and organizing attacks on mosques and public figures in the name of the Tudeh(44). These activities complemented more benign, overt activities with the same general goal carried out by the U.S. embassy staff and the U.S. Information Agency.

BEDAMN was also used to weaken the National Front by undermining its mass base, which consisted mainly of organizations such as the Toilers' and Pan Iranist parties and crowds led by popular figures such as Kashani. Efforts were made to detach Kashani and his followers from the National Front using propaganda, often quite vulgar, that depicted Mosaddeq as a corrupt and immoral person who was exploiting Kashani. Money was also given to a mullah named Mohammad Taqi Falsafi to try to build a clerical alternative to Kashani. Other mullahs were encouraged to adopt a more fundamentalist line to drive them away from Mosaddeq. Efforts were made to turn the Toilers and the Pan Iranists against Mosaddeq and to provoke splits in these organizations. This was done by buying influence among the leaders of these groups through Iranians in the BEDAMN network, who disguised their CIA connections. In a particularly noteworthy case, a CIA contract officer approached Baqai in September or October of 1952 and encouraged him to break with Mosaddeq; Baqai was subsequently also given money. Similar approaches may have been made to Kashani, Makki, and Ayatollah Sayyid Mohammad Behbehani(45).

By November 1952, Kashani, Baqai, Makki, and several other National Front leaders had turned against Mosaddeq. Similarly, the Pan-Iranists had split into pro- and anti-Mosaddeq factions by this time, and Khalil Maleki and his followers in the Toilers' party had split with Baqai and formed a pro-Mosaddeq organization known as the Third Force(46). It is, of course, impossible to determine the degree to which BEDAMN was responsible for this. Most Iranian political figures at this time were extremely opportunistic and ambitious, and could have had many reasons for turning against Mosaddeq. This was especially true of Kashani, Baqai, and Makki. Furthermore, the Rashidians were carrying out similar activities at this time on behalf of the British. The CIA officers who directed BEDAMN are themselves unclear as to its impact; one described it as "important" in encouraging Kashani and Baqai to split with Mosaddeq, while another said it was "limited" in scale. While the CIA thus cannot be credited exclusively with provoking these splits in the National Front, it may well have had a significant role.

An issue which is in some ways more important is the question of who authorized these attacks against Mosaddeq and the National Front. As described above, the official policy of the Truman administration was to support Mosaddeq and not to undermine his government. The State Department, headed at the time by Dean Acheson, unquestionably followed this policy. It thus appears that the decision to undermine Mosaddeq through BEDAMN was taken within the CIA itself. Since the top CIA officials with responsibility for covert operations at this time are now either dead or unable to recall who might have authorized these actions, it is impossible to determine where in the CIA chain of command this "rogue elephant" component of BEDAMN originated(47). ...... Continued

Last changed: September 21, 2007

Re: Azerbaijan

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Date: 11 Jun 2004
Time: 18:59:18
Remote Name: 67.70.38.80

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Shut the fuck up you dirty mongolian cunt. The republic of azerbaijan belongs to Iran and one day we will take it back. until then we will help Armenia destroy your poor little shit hole of a country. PERSIA 4 EVER !!!!

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Re: Azerbaijan

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